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ABSTRACT 
 
In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Robert Lucas claimed that the 
welfare costs of the business cycle in the United States equaled .05 percent of consumption. His 
calculation compared the utility of a representative consumer receiving actual per-capita 
consumption each year with that of a similar consumer receiving the expectation of 
consumption. To a risk-averse person, the latter path of consumption confers more utility, 
because it is less volatile. Applying Amartya Sen’s chooser-dependent preferences to a non–
expected utility case, I will counter Lucas’s claim by arguing that people have different attitudes 
toward risk that is imposed and risk that is voluntarily taken on, and that policymakers, in 
carrying out public duties, must use sorts of reasoning different from those used by the 
optimizing consumers of neoclassical economic theory. 
  
Keywords: costs of the business cycle, non–expected utility preferences, chooser-dependent 
preferences, Amartya Sen 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you receive a paycheck every week for a different, random amount, because you 
work different hours each week. Since you have no bank account, you use your entire paycheck 
for consumption. It seems reasonable to assume that, other things being equal, you would prefer 
to have a constant paycheck with the same expected value each month. How much money would 
you be willing to sacrifice to ensure that you received this mean amount each month and feel 
equally well off?  
  Now consider five variants on this question. In all cases, your consumption follows the 
same random process. In all but the last, you are not allowed to save. In Case I, you have no 
choice over how many hours to work because your employer chooses your hours. You know that 
your employer does this because business varies with the weather, and she cannot afford to 
employ you on a regular schedule. In Case II, on the other hand, you also have no choice about 
your hours of work (also because business is irregular), but in this case, business varies because 
macroeconomic policymakers do not assign a high priority to stabilizing the economy. In Case 
III, your boss frequently flies into rages and cuts or increases your hours capriciously. In Case 
IV, you are investing a given amount of money on behalf of your daughter in college and you 
know she must support herself on the randomly varying income from this investment as long as 
she is a student, without any additional help from you. You feel the mean return on riskless 
investments is too low. Finally, in Case V, you still have a random income for some reason, but 
your income is large enough that you are able to save some money occasionally. You choose 
how much to save each week, but because your income and savings are limited, your 
consumption each week still varies randomly.  
  It seems likely that most people would be willing to pay to avoid random variation in 
their consumption in each of these five situations. Would their willingness to pay be different in 
the five different cases? Sen (1997) has introduced what he calls Achooser-dependent 
preferences@ under which commodity bundle A is preferred to B if Person 1 makes the choice, 
while B is preferred to A if Person 2 makes the selection. For example, suppose a host offers us a 
choice of two pieces of cake of different sizes. We might choose the smaller, out of manners, but 
prefer to receive the larger, if the host were making the decision.    3
  It is easy to imagine that preferences on the random consumption paths in the five cases 
might also depend on the chooser, or source of risk: nature, policymakers, an employer, a father, 
and the consumer. Both the preferences of the chooser and the person being chosen for might be 
affected by the identity of the chooser. To begin with, in some cases, some notion of a role of 
responsibility is involved. A worker might be more angry in Case II (where poor policy caused 
randomness) more than Case I (where the weather was the culprit), because people in whom 
power is entrusted have caused unnecessary hardship. The chooser herself in Case II might feel 
ashamed of her conduct because she had failed in her official duties, but not be so concerned 
about how she managed her personal finances. Sen labels these concerns “fiduciary.” Certainly, 
the legal and ethical rules of fiduciary responsibilities entail many special responsibilities that do 
not extend to personal matters or, for that manner, to ordinary relationships. According to 
modern versions of the Hippocratic Oath, to take one example, doctors have duties not to treat 
illnesses in which they do not have adequate expertise and to put the welfare of the patient above 
all else. 
  Beyond ethical and legal arguments, there are other reasons to believe that preferences 
over consumption streams are chooser dependent. There is an enormous literature in psychology 
arguing that an important determinant of mental health and successful functioning is “locus of 
control”—whether an individual believes events are dictated by her own actions or by forces 
beyond her control (Seligman and Maier 1967). Recall our Case V, where the consumer could, to 
some extent, choose her own consumption path, in spite of the randomness of income, a situation 
that might result in a better sense of internal control than when randomness was determined by 
policy. Goldsmith and Veum (1996) have in fact argued that a change from internal to external 
locus of control is an important impact of unemployment. So, the person for whom policy is 
chosen, and not just the policymaker, is influenced in their welfare judgments by who makes the 
decision.  
  Robert Lucas has recently attempted to estimate the costs of the business cycle, treating it 
as an instance of the random-checks problem (2003, 1987). In his simplest calculation, he 
assumes that the effects of perfect monetary policy would be to completely eliminate all random 
variation in aggregate consumption. He first evaluates the total utility of a single representative 
consumer receiving actual average U.S. consumption over a particular time period. He then   4
compares this with the hypothetical utility that the representative consumer would have had if 
the average consumption variable in the utility function were replaced with its unconditional 
mean in each period. To put the costs in financial terms, he finds the hypothetical proportional 
boost in the random consumption path needed to make the consumer indifferent between the 
random path and the deterministic one. Lucas arrives at the estimate that the costs of the business 
cycle are equivalent in utility terms to .0005 times consumption. He then argues that other 
priorities, designed to boost trend (mean) growth, offer much higher benefits. 
  In this paper, I seek to deal with several questions raised by Lucas’s approach, most of 
them relating to the issues of chooser-dependent preferences I have described. In the next 
section, I review Lucas’s contribution in more detail and briefly describe some of the arguments 
of his critics. In Section III, I attempt a theoretical analysis of the problem using a class of 
chooser-dependent, non–expected utility preferences that allow one to look at the problem in a 
very general way. This class permits consumers to be concerned with many different stochastic 
features of the consumption process, such as autocorrelation, that seem important in this setting. 
Giving several examples, I will show how such preferences could, in principle, result in a 
different answer to the problem. But in his book chapter and paper, Lucas is primarily concerned 
with measurement: he calibrates a sparsely parameterized utility function to arrive at a specific 
cost. In Section IV, I therefore look at the possible hazards associated with such calibration when 
chooser-dependency issues are involved. I link my argument to several new ideas that have been 
discussed recently under the rubric “behavioral welfare economics” (Bernheim 2007; Rabin and 
Koszegi 2007; Camerer 2007; Gul and Pesendorfer 2007). The final section concludes. 
 
II.   REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
In 1987, and again in his 2003 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, 
Robert Lucas made the remarkable claim discussed above. Here we summarize the nature of his 



















  Lucas argues that the costs of the business cycle are due to the fact that utility in any 
given period is concave, or risk averse. In Figure 1, we show such a utility function, U(C), for 
total consumption in any given period. Imagine two hypothetical random consumption paths. In 
Path 1, consumption is at A (recession) one-half of the time and at B (boom) in the other periods. 
In Path 2, consumption is always at the midpoint of A and B, which is labeled D on the graph. In 
Path 1, average utility is given by the height of point E, the midpoint between points [A, U(A)] 
and [B, U(B)] (if the probability of a recession were lower than one-half, the average utility 
would be farther to the right on the straight line). In Path 2, on the other hand, utility is always 
U(D).
1 Lucas argues that consumption is generally something like Path 1, with stochastic 
oscillation between boom and bust. If we were to eliminate the business cycle, we would have a 
                                                 
1 I abstract here from the secular trend in consumption, which Lucas does consider. This does not affect the principle 
of his analysis.   6
path like Path 2, which is always at its mean. Lucas seeks to measure how much people would be 
willing to pay, in terms of mean consumption, to move from Path 1 to Path 2. The costs are 
measured by discounting utility in each period until infinity and adding up the utilities. 
  The equation used to make the calculation is: 
 



















where E is the expectation taken at time 0, β is the discount factor, t is the time period, and λ is 
the variable for which Lucas is solving, his measure of the cost of the business cycle. Lambda 
gives the proportional upward shift in consumption needed to make the representative agent as 
satisfied as she would be if she had average consumption in every period. 
  To arrive at his numerical estimate of λ, Lucas uses the “constant relative risk aversion” 












where ρ is a constant known as “relative risk aversion.” Lucas assumes that the log of Ct follows 
independent and identical normal distributions. He shows that in this setup, the costs of the 
business cycle are 




2 is the variance of the log of consumption. The costs depend upon ρ, because this 
parameter measures the concavity of the period utility function, which was important in our 
graphical analysis of Figure 1. Stating that macroeconomists generally use values of ρ between   7
one and four, Lucas uses ρ=1.
2 As mentioned before, Lucas finds that λ=.0005. Pointing out that, 
of course, even in an ideal world, policymakers could not reduce the variance of consumption to 
zero, he considers empirical evidence as to what percentage of the variance is due to demand 
(“nominal”) shocks.  
  Before discussing the literature spawned by Lucas’s contribution, it might be useful to 
point out that his general approach to evaluating policies is part of a larger project, which might 
be called the “new welfare economics of macroeconomics.” This approach uses microfounded 
representative-agent models to determine the effects of different policy regimes on economic 
variables, and then calculates the expected discounted utility associated with each regime. 
Textbooks by new Classical and neoclassical Keynesian authors, in fact, frequently cite the 
possibility of such welfare analyses as one of the chief benefits of the project of developing a 
microfounded macroeconomics (Sargent 2004; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). This paper can be 
seen as a critical case study of one application of this methodology. The paper focuses on one 
feature that microfounded macroeconomics has in common with almost all microeconomic 
analysis: an assumption that bundles of commodities consumed, not relations among people, are 
what drives all behavior in the economic sphere (Anderson 1993). 
  The remainder of this section will touch on some of the main points made in 
contributions subsequent to Lucas’s book and paper. A key problem with the representative 
agent approach is that, in reality, the economy comprises numerous agents, whose consumption 
is affected differently by the business cycle. For example, while aggregate consumption rarely 
falls in a recession by more than a few percent, many unemployed individuals experience much 
greater falls in their consumption during a recession, and others continue to consume the same 
amount or more. There is a theoretical rationale for ignoring individual variation in consumption: 
in models of risk, it is often assumed that there are complete markets, which means that agents 
can insure against any individual-level risk, including unemployment. To see the general idea, 
suppose that the population is “very large,” so that we can invoke the law of large numbers, and 
that each employee (i) has a “job” that is like a security that pays off a wage  
 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, the period utility function is found by taking the limit of a slightly different constant relative risk 
aversion period utility function as ρ approaches one. This gives a log function.   8
Wit=aitYt, 
 
in period t, where  
 
P(ait=u) = .05 for all i and all t; u=constant 
P(ait=e) = .95 for all i and all t; e=constant  
Yt is national income in period t 
e>u 
 
  In this model, unemployment is five percent and the unemployed receive a lower share of 
national income than the employed. The complete markets assumption is that an “unemployment 
insurance” scheme, or something like it, enables all workers to own a diversified “portfolio” of 
all jobs, earning a return of Wt=((.5)u+(.95)e)Yt (the average income of all jobs). In this model, 
what is important is the variation in Yt (aggregate income), not in the income of individual jobs, 
Wit. Of course, creating the appropriate form of insurance is an important policy problem, from 
Lucas’s perspective, but he sees the costs-of-the-business-cycle issue as separable from that one. 
Certainly, he is right in a sense: unemployment insurance is not generally seen as a responsibility 
of central bankers and other macro policymakers. But matters are not as clear cut as a single 
complete-markets model would have it. This paper will not attempt to sort out this complex and 
thorny issue, which has generated many articles and books of its own.
3 
  Nonetheless, some work has been done within Lucas’s framework to grapple with the 
problem of “heterogeneous agents.” Krusell and Smith (1999) have estimated a model in which 
no insurance is available, but workers can self-insure by saving if their incomes are high enough. 
They calibrate their model with micro data on wealth and employment. In their paper, roughly 
speaking, the costs of the business cycle are the savings that could be obtained by eliminating 
only aggregate shocks to Yt, not the randomness in ait. They find that the steady-state costs of 
unemployment are 20 times as high as Lucas’s estimate. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) 
                                                 
3 Another “elephant in the room” is the issue of utility from work and leisure. Lucas argues that since leisure confers 
positive utility, his estimate is upwardly biased by the omission of leisure from the utility function (1987). Though 
most people would probably enjoy a vacation, work clearly has positive effects on well-being, conferring a sense of 
contributing to society and a feeling of accomplishment.   9
conduct a similar exercise with an overlapping generations model, taking into account the fact 
that the ait may be more volatile in recessions. They estimate the costs of the business cycle at 
.00144 of consumption (see also Mukoyama and Şahin 2006).  
  A number of contributions have altered Lucas’s assumption of a constant relative risk 
aversion utility function and a log-normally distributed consumption process. Obstfeld (1992) 
uses a non–expected utility function, which allows for separate parameters for risk aversion and 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Weil 1990). He notes that with this setup, persistent 
shocks may have different effects from nonpersistent ones. This seems important to the business 
cycle issue, because autocorrelation, and perhaps nonstationarity, is one obvious feature of real-
world business-cycle shocks. With a unit-root consumption process and Lucas’s assumption of 
unitary risk aversion, the costs of the cycle amount to between .000242 and .001783, depending 
on the value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; these costs rise to between .005198 
and .036957 for risk aversion of 20. We touch on papers that estimate utility function parameters 
later in this section. 
  Yellen and Akerlof (2004) have provided a broad critique. They argue that stabilization 
policy can probably affect the mean of consumption, not only its variance. They also stress that 
unemployment could have nonlinear effects on utility. For example, a week of unemployment 
may have greater costs during times of high aggregate unemployment, since longer spells of 
unemployment are more common then. Long spells have disproportionately large utility costs, 
for example, because people have fixed financial commitments, such as home mortgages.  
  Alvarez and Jermann (2004) measure costs by using observed asset prices. Essentially, 
they construct a composite security that yields a stream of returns “similar” to the observed 
process of aggregate consumption. They then determine from the prices of the underlying 
securities what people would be willing to pay for the composite security. They find that the 
costs of all consumption uncertainty are extremely large, but the costs of removing the business 
cycle are between .0008 and .0049. Alvarez and Jermann use a form of non–expected value 
functional similar to the utility functionals used in Section III of this paper. 
 
  Wolfers (2003) directly estimates the costs of the business cycle using surveys of 
subjective well-being, instead of a utility function. He looks at the effects of levels of   10
unemployment and inflation, but the findings most relevant to Lucas’s paper show that halving 
the standard deviation of unemployment would increase average well-being by the same amount 
as reducing average unemployment by one quarter of 1 percent. Consistent with Yellen and 
Akerlof’s argument, Wolfers finds that the volatility of unemployment has nonlinear effects on 
subjective well-being. 
  Since Section IV discusses efforts at measurement, it is important to mention the 
extensive efforts to calibrate constant relative risk aversion utility functions.
4 Perhaps the highest 
estimates come from data on household asset holdings. The “equity-premium puzzle”—low 
household equity holdings, despite high average returns—is known to imply very high relative 
risk aversion in a standard model. Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) argue that, in order to match 
the first moments of asset returns, they must assume a relative risk aversion of 29. However, this 
estimate exceeds two previous calibrations using asset holdings. Friend and Blume estimate 
values of “well in excess of one and probably in excess of two” (1975). Hansen and Singleton 
(1982), using a generalized instrumental variable technique, find that values may well be 
negative.  
  Szpiro (1986) estimates risk aversion at between 1.2 and 1.8 by comparing total property 
and liability insurance in force with the total value of all property, taking into account overhead 
costs and profits. Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) report ranges of relative risk 
aversion for respondents to the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, who were asked which of 
several hypothetical, large gambles on lifetime income they would accept. Sixty-five percent of  
all respondents chose a gamble that would imply an expected risk aversion of 15.7, though  
significant numbers had much lower risk aversions (p. 548). A now-large literature attempts to 
estimate risk aversion from the behavior of television game show contestants. For example, 
Hartley, Lanot, and Walker (2006) conclude from data on the show “Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire?” that relative risk aversion is approximately one.   
  It is clear that many theoretical limitations and numerical ambiguities in the costs of 
                                                 
4 In the constant relative risk aversion utility function, which is still very widely used, relative risk aversion also 
happens to be equal to the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption (assuming optimizing behavior). 
So, some might say that estimates of this parameter are also germane. However, in more general non–expected 
utility functions such as Weil’s (1990), relative risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity are independent 
parameters. Both would have effects on the costs of the business cycle, as Obstfeld (1992) points out, and the model 
in Section III can include such effects, but our studies of calibration procedures in Section IV will concentrate on   11
business cycles are well recognized. This paper attempts to deal with some of those problems. In 
the next section, rather than enter the debate over the proper functional form of the utility 
function and the characteristics of the consumption process, I use a very general non–expected 
utility functional. I also make no strong assumptions about how macro policy affects the 
consumption process, allowing for the observation of Akerlof and others that moments other 
than the variance could be involved. In Section IV, I deal with some of the obvious problems of 
using estimates of relative risk aversion like the ones discussed in the previous two paragraphs to 
judge the welfare effects of any policies, including macroeconomic stabilization. The entire 
paper concentrates on the implications of Sen’s chooser-dependence idea, which, to my 
knowledge, has not been applied to the costs of the business cycle.  
 
III.   A MODEL OF CHOOSER-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LUCAS’S CALCULATION 
 
Sen (1997) symbolizes his notion of chooser-dependent preferences with a preference relation, 
defined over some choice set Q, like 
pf ij ij ,, ,  
 
where the symbols mean i disprefers (prefers) when j chooses.
5 To use Sen’s example, discussed 
in the introduction, suppose A is a large piece of cake and B is a small one. Sen points out that 
Person 1 may prefer A when Person 2 chooses but would prefer B if she is offered a choice from 
a plate (to be polite). In this case 
BA B A pf 12 11 ,, ,  
 
  I wish to apply this concept to consumption streams. To keep things manageable, I will 
assume that the representative consumer consumes a random vector of amounts of a single good 
 
( ) ( , , ,...., ) cc c cc tT = 012  
                                                                                                                                                             
risk aversion.   12
 
in time periods t=0,1,2,3,….T, with  
0 ≤ ≤ cc t * 
 
(it is convenient to assume that lives are finite, but T should be considered a fairly large number. 
Also, c* can be as large as necessary). I will abuse notation slightly here, by using the left side of 
the previous equation to indicate the entire consumption vector and also sometimes, as in the 
inequality, using ct to refer to the value at a particular time t.  
  Under very general conditions, there exists a distribution function for this vector 
 
Fc cc c Fc Tt (,,, . . . ,) () 012 =  
 
This allows any sort of autocorrelation, heteroskedacticity, nonstationarity, etc., in the 
consumption process (consumption is deterministic at time zero, so the marginal distribution for 
c0 is degenerate). All distribution functions F of this type on the T-dimensional closed interval 
 
Sc t
T =×=0 0 [,* ]  
 
can be characterized by particular necessary and sufficient features. I call the set of all such 
functions with these features F*.  
  Rather than starting with an ordinal preference relationship, this model begins with utility 
functionals. Instead of saying utility is equal to the expected sum of the discounted values of 
period utility, I would like to use a utility functional—a mapping of distributions F onto the real 
numbers. A number of utility functionals defined on F* exist: 
 
UF R ij , :* →  
which is the utility for Person i, in period 0, of the consumption stream, when Person j chooses.
6 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 He also discusses preferences that depend on the choice set, but I will be dealing with that subject only indirectly. 
6 Note that in general a utility function of this type may be time inconsistent. That is, the relative utilities of 
consumption path A may seem preferable to B at time zero, but then I may change my mind when I get to time t+k.   13
This sort of utility functional is similar to a utility function defined on lotteries. This class of 
non–expected utility functionals defined on nonindependent multivariate distributions has been 
studied without chooser-dependence (Karni 1989; Safra and Segal 1993). In all cases, we assume 
that the same person is the actual consumer/citizen. By defining utility on distributions, rather 
than actual consumption bundles, I allow the consumer to care about many different features of 
the consumption process.
7 
  Of course, in practice, the consumption stream enjoyed by a consumer is not chosen by 
any one person or political body. One way of looking at the problem is to think of a 
macroeconomic authority taking into account the actions of other agents—other policymakers, 
consumers, and firms—as a function of their own decisions. Then, the choice set of the 
macroeconomic decision maker is a set of joint outcomes of the strategies of all agents, given the 
strategies of the macroeconomic authority. In other words, the macroeconomic authority would 
be choosing among a set of strategies, each expected to lead to a certain consumption path, given 
the strategies of the other public and private agents in the economy. Then, from the perspective 
of the policymaker, the choice would be, in a sense, entirely her own, and the appropriate utility 
function would have the policymaker as j. It is also true that, even in a given situation, 
perceptions or beliefs about who is choosing may differ, depending on the circumstances or 
individual. 
  The class of non–expected utility functions just introduced is helpful because important 
theoretical objections and empirical anomalies have arisen in connection with the standard 
expected, discounted utility (DU), infinite horizon model, in which utility is given by 
 











where U(c) is a standard period utility function, such as the constant relative risk aversion form 
used by Lucas.  
                                                                                                                                                             
There is no way around this problem in welfare analysis, except to evaluate utility from a given time period (in fact, 
the plausibility of time-inconsistent preferences has been one of the major critiques of the DU model). 
7 It turns out that under fairly weak assumptions about the “acquisitiveness” of the underlying preference relation, 
and with some smoothness conditions, one can say a great deal about the nature of the functional U. Specifically, it   14
  Three key features of the expected DU model have been called into question. The first is 
the use, even in a deterministic setting, of a discounted sum of the values of a single period 
utility function (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). Second, in the expected DU 
model, utility is expressed as the expected value of a function of the random vector or sequence, 
a feature that brings problems of its own (Machina 1987). Third, in this model, dislike of risk is 
modeled solely by concavity of the period utility function, as measured by relative risk aversion 
(Rabin and Thaler 2001).  
  Numerous exceptions exist to all three of these features, but I will just give a flavor of 
them. The first feature is inconsistent with evidence that people may discount $100 deferred 
from today until one week from today more than they discount $100 deferred from 52 weeks 
from now until 53 weeks from now. Also, it seems that many people dislike roller-coaster utility 
paths or prefer paths that rise over time. The second feature of the expected DU model (the 
expected-utility aspect) is subject to numerous classical and behavioral paradoxes, such as the 
Allais paradox. The risk aversion aspect of the theory (which is not completely separate from the 
expected utility issue) is subject to the point that while most people certainly dislike risk in some 
sense and seek to avoid it, their behavior is not well explained by “risk aversion” (concavity of 
the utility function). Matthew Rabin (2000) has shown that with a concave utility function in 
money, a mild unwillingness to take small risks (say, turning down a bet offering a 50 percent 
chance of losing $100 and a 50 percent chance of gaining $110) implies turning down larger bets 
on very favorable terms (a 50 percent chance of losing $1,000 and a 50 percent chance of 
winning $100 billion). This statement holds regardless of how wealthy the gambler is to begin 
with. Concern about risk may be better modeled using ideas forwarded by psychologists and 
behavioral economists, such as disutility from dreading the future, myopic neglect of 
catastrophic risk, and loss aversion (see, for example, Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, and Welch 
2001; Krantz and Kunreuther 2006).   
  
  As an example of the flexibility of the non–expected utility preferences used here, we 
could have 
                                                                                                                                                             
can be written as a functional of the marginal distributions (Safra and Segal 1993).    15





, [] () =−
= ∑ θπ  
 
where the θs are positive weights, and 
 
F c F ccc c c tt t ( ) (* ,* ,* , . . . , , . . . . ,* ) =  
 
is the marginal distribution of consumption in a particular period t. This utility functional is the 
negative of a weighted sum of the probabilities that income will be below πt, say, the poverty 
level, in each period t. Of course, by this measure, the costs of the business cycle in an 
industrialized country are probably zero, because average consumption rarely, if ever, falls 
below the poverty line. But the π’s could be living standards of some type, possibly rising over 
time. If the chooser were the government, this might be a good utility function; perhaps many 
individual citizens would act differently, gambling everything to maximize the possibility of 
becoming wealthy. 
  Central banks are interested in preventing recessions and in promoting growth—
responsibilities that do not agree perfectly with individual objectives. As an example, consider 




t [, ' ] () 0 1 = ∫  
 
where  
Ac ccc c cc tT T = ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ − {:' . . . * } 012 1  
 
This function is gives the probability that c never goes down, conditional on the known initial 
level of consumption, c’0. 
  We have noted that psychological considerations might make risk more costly when it is 
imposed by another person. If the utility functional is smooth, it turns out that risk aversion can 
be rigorously defined (Karni 1989). A simpler approach is a chooser-dependent functional in   16
which risk—measured by the variances, as in Lucas’s case—is more negatively weighted 
relative to averages when one person is choosing for another, and the autocovariances are 
negatively weighted. Also, the discount rates can be different for each period, allowing for 
hyperbolic discounting, etc.  
 



























δδ σρ  
 
where Φ1>1, 0<Φ2<1, 0<Φ3<1; δ=1 when i=j and δ=0 otherwise; the D(t)s are discounting 
functions, which take on positive, real values for integers between 0 and T; σt
2 are the variances 
of the (possibly nonstationary) consumptions; and ρt
2 are their first-order autocovariances. 
Utility functionals can also be devised in which the chooser does not know the true distribution.
8 
  It is not the purpose of this section to choose a particular utility function, only to suggest 
the variety that might exist, once chooser-dependency is taken into account. Also, some of the 
examples show that utility functions for the choices of consumers do not always make sense for 
policymakers, and vice-versa. In the rest of this section, in which the costs of the business cycle 
are analyzed, no particular functional is assumed.  
  Within the context of the utility functions analyzed in this section, suppose that H is the 
distribution of the consumption path with stabilization policy and J is the distribution with no 
                                                 
8 A nonchooser dependent version of this class of preferences, with the added wrinkle that the chooser could not 
perceive the true distribution of consumption, would be 
 
UF wcd gFc tt
S
[] () (() ) = ∫  
 
where w is a continuous, real-valued utility function of all T consumption bundles, defined on the domain S, and g is 
a function that preserves the necessary and sufficient conditions for a distribution. The function g distorts the 
distribution, resulting in an incorrect estimate of future utility. An example of such a function would be  
 
gFc c c Fc c c TT ( ( , ,...., )) ( ( , ,...., )) 01 01 =
α  
 
where α>0. For 0<α<1, this results in an overly optimistic view about the future and an overestimate of expected 
future utility. For α>1, the decision maker makes the reverse error. This function demonstrates that the utility 
function here is capable of encompassing a simplified version of “animal spirits” in which the person acts as if she 
“knows” an incorrect distribution (Keynes 1936).   
   17
stabilization policy. H could differ from J in any number of ways: in the spirit of Lucas’s 
exercise, H’s variance or autocovariance could be lower, or it could take a particular value with 
probability one. Let 
 
U F (, ) η  
 
be utility when  
( , , ,....., ) η η η η ccc c T 013  
 
is distributed according to F. The same utility functional without the eta argument will refer to 
the case where 
η = 1 
 
Then, in Lucas’s framework, the costs of the business cycle could be measured using the 
equation 
U H UJ (, ) ( , ) 1 = η  
 
  Note that a smaller eta indictes larger business-cycle costs, unlike Lucas’s lambda. 
Multiplying the consumption vector by eta inevitably affects the variance and other moments of 
a distribution, not just the mean, but this generally happens when a variable grows larger or 
smaller. U would still be strictly decreasing in eta, as long people are acquisitive in some sense. 
  We have argued that it is sometimes useful to include i, j subscripts when utility is 
evaluated. Earlier, we identified the utility function as the utility of i when j was the chooser. It is 
important to note that i may not be the consumer or citizen here, even though the arguments in 
the function relate to that person’s consumption. Here, it is always the citizen/consumer who is 
doing the consuming, but the “subject” of the utility, i, may be some sort of fiduciary, such as a 
policymaker. Then, the function might tell us how that person should act. Sen’s interest in 
introducing these preferences was to describe choice behavior, not welfare, but clearly a kind of 
welfare or normative judgment is involved in the issues we discuss here. Nonetheless, the 
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explicit motivation for some of the choice behavior studied by Sen in his article was some form 
of welfare consideration. 
  One of the two main points of this paper is that the utility functionals for policy analysis 
should not be the same ones used to analyze the behavior of private consumers, p. It may be true 
that, using the true, chooser-dependent utility functions 
 
UH U J pp pp ,, (, ) ( , ) 1 = η  
 
with eta being the same as before. However, the real subject and chooser in this problem are 
either the macroeconomic authorities (m) and themselves, or the citizenry and the 
macroeconomic authorities. Then, if people resent random variation imposed by indifferent 
policymakers more then variation that is self-chosen, it may be true that 
 
UH U J pm pm ,, (, ) (* , ) 1 = η  
 
where η*<η.  
  
  Similarly, if we are looking at how the macroeconomic policymakers make their own 
choices, measuring the appropriate costs of the business cycle may yield 
 
UH U J mm mm ,, (, ) ( * * , ) 1 = η  
 
where η**<η  
if the policymakers believe they have a special duty, above and beyond anyone’s personal utility, 
to be mindful in making their decisions of the certain kinds of welfare costs to others.
9 
                                                 
9 The last example raises an issue that has been discussed by critiques of neoclassical and utilitarian theories of value 
and rationality. There are limits to modeling the ethical obligations of decision makers with any sort of utility 
function. If my utility function depends on discharging my obligations and on my material possessions, the 
implication may be that I would always be willing to violate my ethics for a sufficiently large bribe. Or, similarly, 
some such preferences might imply citizens angry over injustice or incompetent policy could always be placated 
with patronage. Our preferences, however, are always on behalf of the consumer, even when they are used to   19
  The work of this section has been directed at noting how, in principle, the costs of the 
business cycle could be chooser dependent, in the way Sen suggested. In the process, I have used 
a much broader set of preferences than those considered by Lucas. Lucas’s actual calculation 
used a calibration approach common in welfare economics, to which I will turn next.  
 
IV.   THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHOOSER-DEPENDENCY FOR QUANTITATIVE 
MEASUREMENTS OF BUSINESS CYCLE COSTS AND EMPIRICAL WELFARE 
ANALYSES 
 
Recall that Lucas measures the costs of the business cycle by lambda, using the constant relative 
risk aversion preferences 
 
E

























∑ ∑  
 
Recall that Lucas’s calculation depends crucially on rho, which is known as relative risk 
aversion. Lucas cites certain values for rho that macroeconomists consider plausible. As 
mentioned in Section II, this parameter can be, and has been, gauged in a number of ways: the 
behavior of game show contestants, the amount of insurance in force, survey questions on 
hypothetical lifetime income gambles, and so on. Of course, as mentioned in the previous 
section, there are numerous empirical exceptions and theoretical objections to this form of utility 
function. But suppose that this is the right utility function, or that one is conducting the analysis 
with some more plausible function that also lacks chooser-dependence. 
  In conducting welfare analyses, using real-world behavior to calibrate utility functions or 
other measures of costs and benefits is a common technique that has recently been criticized 
(Camerer 2007). The idea is essentially a variant of revealed preference. I will show how the 
                                                                                                                                                             
describe the decision making of a policymaker. So a bribe to the policymaker would not enter the utility function. 
Moreover, absolute prohibitions could be modeled with functions that, say, took on a higher value for any 
distribution F where the probability of being in poverty was zero in all periods. 
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idea works, then illustrate what might go wrong. The economist does an empirical study of 
market behavior, using the utility function that needs to be used for the welfare analysis. In our 
case of non–expected value preferences over finite consumption streams, we might observe a 
choice between two alternatives, K and L. These could be securities, insurance policies, or 
moves in a game.  













where the two rhos are parameter values; they could be levels of relative risk aversion, or any 
other parameter in the utility function. The consumer chooses alternative K. In light of the 
consumer’s choice, or maybe several choices, we would conclude that  
 
ρ ρ = 1 
rather than  
ρ ρ = 2 
 
We would then conduct the welfare analysis discussed earlier, using the following equation 
 
UH U J ρρ η
11 1 (, ) ( , ) =  
 
But I argue that a problem can arise here: the use of empirically estimated parameters for welfare 
analysis can be misleading when the social context of the market choice used for calibration of 
the parameter is different from the social context of the policy decision.
10 This problem arises 
                                                 
10 The idea that welfare analysis can be contaminated if the social conditions of choices observed by the economist 
(such as the degree of autonomy) are inappropriate for the welfare judgment at hand is developed in Anderson’s 
critique of cost-benefit analysis (1993). Sen (1973) discusses how revealed preferences may not reflect welfare or   21
here because the true utility function must be indexed by i and j, and the studies used for 
calibration mentioned above almost all use observations of voluntary, private decisions, where i 
and j are both the consumer. There is a mismatch between the choosers in these empirical studies 
and the choosers in macroeconomic policy decisions.  
  Exactly where does the problem arise? We have arrived at the previous parameter 
estimate by observing the choice of K over L. So, it is true that, assuming optimizing behavior, 

















for the appropriate i and j. Indeed, it may be true that 
 
 
UH U J ij ij ρρ η
11 1 ,, ,, (, ) ( , ) =
         (1) 
 
 
where eta is the same as before. But, let us say that the welfare analysis, say the estimate of the 
costs of the cycle, is conducted under conditions in which i’ is choosing, and j’ is the subject of  
the utility function, with 
 
ii ≠ ' 
or 
jj ≠ ' 
 
  Now, getting back to the insurance study, or some other form of calibration, recall that K 
                                                                                                                                                             
self-interest.   22
was chosen over L. But, if we had done the study with the same choosers as the policy problem, 
that is, with the same chooser and subject as “insurance purchasers,” we might have found a 
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This implies, that for a policy choice involving i’ and j’, the better parameter to use is in fact ρ2 
rather than ρ1. This paper does not address how such a calibration might be done. Conceivably, 
for some cases when the chooser was a fiduciary, one could observe the portfolios of trusts.  
  In any case, with the correct parameter value in hand, we use the following equation  
 
UH U J ij ij ρρ η
22 1 ,' ,' ,' ,' (, ) ( , ) =
 
 
for the business-cycle-costs problem. There is no reason why one would necessarily arrive at the 
same eta as in (1). 
  Assuming one were interested in using the constant relative risk aversion utility function, 



















0 1  
 
0<γ<1    
where again δ=1 if i=j, and δ=0 otherwise   23
  This function increases risk aversion for situations in which someone is choosing for 
another person. This would result in an increase in the measured costs of the business cycle. This 
may well not be the proper utility function; in fact, it is probably not. It simply exemplifies how 
things might change if chooser-dependence were taken into account.   
  Here, the focus has been on preferences that depend on the identity of the chooser. Some 
similar observations have recently been made about problems in welfare analyses when utility or 
choice depends upon various “ancillary conditions” of the type studied by behavioral economists 
(Rabin and Koszegi 2007; Camerer 2007; Bernheim 2007; Gul and Pesendorfer 2007). The point 
of their research is to point out that when welfare economists make estimates of parameters for 
the purpose of policy analysis, they may observe choices that are influenced by irrelevant 
ancillary conditions, such as the “frame” of the decision. These are often clearly “mistakes” that 
are recognized by people when they are pointed out. To base a welfare analysis on a parameter 
estimated in this way is difficult and may call for special techniques, heretofore unknown, to 
take into account the importance of the ancillary conditions. Rabin and Koszegi (2007) argue 
that preferences may be “revealed,” even if they are not “implemented” in the form of actual 
behavior.  
  Clearly, this problem may apply to the measurement of risk aversion. In the case of risk 
aversion, people are sensitive to various contextual and ancillary conditions. Even when these 
anomalies are pointed out to experimental subjects, the subjects often do not agree that their 
behavior was a “mistake” in any sense. Take the case of insurance purchases, which has often 
been used to estimate relative risk aversion (see the references in Section II). Subjects often 
report, for example, that they purchased insurance for “peace of mind,” a form of “anticipatory 
utility” (Krantz and Kunreuther 2006). They may be more likely to buy insurance in contexts in 
which anxiety is heightened, e.g., the purchase of flight insurance in an airport. They often 
overinsure against minor losses; this is explained by “myopic loss aversion.” An example would 
be a reluctance to invest in stocks if portfolios are anxiously checked for losses each quarter. 
Also, people tend to underinsure against catastrophic events. An example would be the difficulty 
in selling flood insurance, especially when there has been no recent flood in a given area. 
Clearly, these are all reasons to doubt that parameters estimated from insurance data could be a 
sound basis for any sort of normative or welfare analysis.      24
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
Robert Lucas (1987, 2003) has attempted to measure the costs of the business cycle by 
calculating the utility of an average consumer in two different situations. In the first, the 
consumer receives a sequence of consumption bundles equal in size to actual average 
consumption in the United States. In the second, the consumer receives a deterministic stream, 
set equal to expected consumption in each period. The costs of the business cycle are then the 
proportion by which the first consumption stream would have to be increased to make the 
consumer just as well off as with the second, deterministic stream. This paper has applied 
Amartya Sen’s (1997) notion of chooser-dependence to this problem, arguing that the source of 
the randomness in the consumption stream probably affects how consumers and policymakers 
feel about it. Aside from the theoretical observation that true costs could be affected by the 
identity of the chooser, I argued that welfare calculations of the type used by Lucas could be 
distorted by faulty calibration. This could occur if parameters were calculated in a market in 
which Person j was the chooser, and then welfare was “measured” using that estimated 
parameter in a situation when a different Person, j’, was the chooser or subject of the utility 
function. 
  Lucas’s estimate represents an approach to policy analysis marked by the use of the 
utility functions of representative agents. This approach is a relatively new one, which has 
accompanied the revolution over the past 35 years in the way macroeconomics is done. The 
issues raised in this paper may arise in other areas in the new welfare economics of 
macroeconomics: the measurement of the welfare costs of inflation, the welfare effects of 
monetary shocks, and so on. Problems with chooser-dependence are closely related to a more 
general set of pitfalls in welfare economics that arise when choices depend on “ancillary 
conditions.” If these difficulties prove insurmountable, it may be that simpler criteria for policy 
analysis, in terms of outcomes such as unemployment or capabilities, are no less reliable than 
more modern techniques, and are better able to provide practical guidance.     25
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